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WHEN IS FEAR FOR ONE’S LIFE 
RACE-GENDERED? 
AN INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS’S 
IN RE A-R-C-G- DECISION 
Ange-Marie Hancock* 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2014, the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) handed 
down a breakthrough decision, In re A-R-C-G-,1 permitting courts to 
consider domestic violence as a gendered form of persecution in a home 
country and thus grounds for asylum in the United States.  Along with two 
other 2014 decisions, In re W-G-R-2 and In re M-E-V-G-,3 this case 
represented a marked shift from prior BIA decisions, which for fifteen years 
had interpreted sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act more narrowly, thus excluding claims of home country 
abuse as reasonable grounds to grant asylum.  Specifically, in A-R-C-G-, 
the BIA found that Guatemalan women fleeing domestic violence can be 
considered a “particular social group” (PSG).4  Its decision has been 
celebrated as a step forward in resolving contradictory and arbitrary 
outcomes that persisted in a vacuum of jurisprudential norms about the 
issue.5 
The definition of a “particular social group” is key to understanding the 
possible ramifications of the decision.  While legal theorists have a specific 
 
*  Associate Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies, University of Southern 
California.  This Article is part of a larger symposium entitled Critical Race Theory and 
Empirical Methods Conference held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview 
of the symposium, see Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword:  Critical Race Theory and Empirical 
Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953 (2015). 
 
 1. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 2. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 3. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 4. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388. 
 5. A press release from the Hastings Center for Refugee and Gender Studies 
specifically states:  “This ruling has the potential to affect immigrant women survivors of 
domestic violence across the country . . . . The Board’s decision signals a move away from 
restrictive interpretations of the law that have made it difficult for domestic violence 
survivors to receive protection in the United States.” Press Release, Ctr. for Gend. & 
Refugee Studies, CGRS Applauds Decision That Could Help Women and Children at 
Artesia Detention Center (Aug. 26, 2014), available at http://www.icontact-
archive.com/QFS-zoj1ul57i8PSf-6LKzKZmjJEO7j3?w=3. 
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definition of how PSGs are constituted, a wide body of literature on the 
social construction of target populations shapes how societal groups are 
perceived and their ability to gain relief from government institutions to 
address the challenges they face, whether the fact of their group 
membership is accepted or contested.  Much of the law and society 
literature that addresses racial and gendered perceptions of respondents has 
focused on two areas:  (1) civil rights claims (such as equal protection, 
antidiscrimination, etc.) where legal logic has focused on PSGs already 
named by legislative authorities; and (2) criminal contexts where a wide 
swath of studies have examined how racial and gendered norms shape the 
way juries or judges perceive defendants and how these norms impact 
conviction rates and sentencing. 
It is not clear, however, that either approach fits the administrative 
mission of the BIA or its logic in constructing a PSG.  In this Article, I 
conduct a paradigm intersectionality analysis of In re A-R-C-G- to better 
understand its possible ramifications for future asylum seekers fleeing 
domestic violence.  In doing so, I also examine the decision’s impact upon 
immigrant women of color fleeing domestic violence. 
Much of the work in representing women seeking asylum has proceeded 
from a gender perspective.  Centers like the U.C. Hastings Center for 
Gender and Refugee Studies have provided critical legal discourse, asking 
courts to rethink what it means to be a member of a PSG and to look 
beyond the traditional reliance on legislative authority to provide such 
definitions.  It is easy to see that these arguments have benefited, even if 
narrowly, from the logic of intersectionality, which has long contended that 
there is a strong connection between the diversity among women and a 
meaningful realistic opportunity for relief from domestic violence. 
One of the most widely cited articles on intersectionality, Mapping the 
Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women 
of Color by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw,6 has garnered the most attention 
for the “new” approach Crenshaw called intersectionality.  Yet, equally 
important is Crenshaw’s choice to address violence against women, the 
component of domestic violence that has received the lion’s share of 
attention in activism, case law, and policy reform.  Later authors, like G. 
Chezia Carraway and Celeste Montoya, built on Crenshaw’s attention to 
violence against women in both the legal and the transnational activism 
domains. 
The most widely attributed, if not precisely accurate, insight of 
intersectionality—the vast diversity existing within a pervasiveness of 
gendered oppression—is usually the takeaway from statements like this one 
by Carraway: 
The accepted practice of wife burning in India, the epidemic of wife 
beatings and murders in Brazil, the maiming and murder of children in the 
Angolan war for independence, the wholesale prostitution of women and 
 
 6. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
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children in the Philippines as a means of familial economic survival, the 
bombings of reproductive health clinics in the United States, and the 
failure to develop coalitions that address the needs of women of color all 
continue to reflect the belief that violence against women is culturally 
acceptable, and therefore not a human rights abuse.  Our struggle must be 
a collective struggle . . . in order to have any formidable impact on 
violence in the lives of women.7 
Here, I want to focus on the substance of the pervasiveness of violence 
against women instead.  Montoya contends that even in the twenty-first 
century, countries with high “objective” scores in gender equality like those 
countries in Northern Europe still face issues with violence against 
women.8  In this vein, Montoya agrees with Carraway across what is now a 
twenty-year time frame:  while activism and policy reform efforts focus on 
protection, prosecution and prevention, tension persists between legislation 
passed and on-the-ground effectiveness.  Covering a similar time frame, 
Blaine Bookey delineates seven distinct jurisprudential shifts that range 
from circa 1994 through 2012, arguing that similar tensions persist in the 
United States due to:  (1) the wide variation in immigration judges’ 
interpretations of ruling precedent; and (2) a lack of transparency about BIA 
decisions due to their inaccessibility through public searchable databases, 
which both contribute to the limited impact of any pro-survivor decisions.9 
Thus, violence against women constitutes a large subset of the cases that 
fall under the definition of “domestic violence” and is also a multivalent 
issue ripe for intersectional analysis.  There is ample evidence from the 
literature to support this second claim.  First, a long line of critical race and 
feminist legal studies literature has argued for the utility of intersectionality 
in understanding the specific challenges faced by women in target 
populations like African American or immigrant groups when they attempt 
to obtain legal relief or policy reform.10  Second, as Bookey, Montoya, and 
Crenshaw all note in different ways, the lack of transparency and available 
data for understanding the precise challenges and obstacles to relief 
continues to constrain the questions that can be asked and the reforms that 
can be proposed by activists in this space. 
A particularly transnational dimension of this second point merits 
elaboration.  As lack of understanding and attention to intersectional 
dimensions of the issue persist, so too do our limited imaginations about 
 
 7. G. Chezia Carraway, Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 
1308 (1991). 
 8. CELESTE MONTOYA, FROM GLOBAL TO GRASSROOTS:  THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
TRANSANATIONAL ADVOCACY AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 4 (2013). 
 9. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence As a Basis for Asylum:  An Analysis of 206 Case 
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 109–10 
(2013).  Bookey analyzed 206 cases from a database privately maintained by the Center for 
Gender and Refugee Studies at the U.C. Hastings College of Law. Id. at 110–11.  The 
database includes 6000 gender-based asylum cases including those involving children and 
LGBT status. Id. at 110.  All 206 cases involved male perpetrators and female survivors. Id. 
at 111. 
 10. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 6. 
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policy interventions and legal remedies,11 which has a disparate impact on 
the ability of immigrant women of color to gain relief in the United States.  
I return to this point about data availability regarding both those who are 
affected by domestic violence as well as the policy solutions that might 
work in my later analysis of the BIA decision. 
The arguments made by Crenshaw, Anannya Bhattacharjee, and others 
have contributed greatly to the part of intersectionality’s intellectual project 
that focuses on rendering previously invisible target populations’ needs for 
relief visible to activists, legal advocates, and policy makers alike.12  
However, relatively little attention has been paid to precisely how to apply 
intersectionality analysis to the challenges of survivors who have been 
made visible.  One result of this inattention to proper methodologies has 
been an uncritical embrace of positivist empirical strategies that actually 
violate the terms of the second part of intersectionality’s intellectual project, 
which focuses on reshaping the articulation of relationships among 
categories like race, ethnicity, gender, class, and nationality.  Writing in the 
same year as Crenshaw, Chela Sandoval articulates this part of 
intersectionality’s project:  “[N]o [categorical] enactment is privileged over 
any other, and the recognition that each [categorical] site is as potentially 
effective in opposition as any other makes possible another mode of 
consciousness which is particularly effective under late capitalist and post-
modern cultural conditions in the United States.”13  Crenshaw and Sandoval 
both argue for equal if not identical attention to multiple categories.  
However,  again, the issue of how to do this in a way that does not violate 
the additional tenet of intersectionality—that such categories co-construct 
and mutually reinforce each other—has been generally set aside in favor of 
standard social scientific approaches.  These approaches include 
multivariate regression that explicitly assume mutual exclusivity among 
variables like race and gender, particularly at the data collection stage.14 
In this Article, I use a paradigm intersectionality approach to understand 
A-R-C-G- from a 360-degree perspective that takes up all dimensions of 
 
 11. Anannya Bhattacharjee, A Slippery Path:  Organizing Resistance to Violence 
Against Women, in DRAGON LADIES:  FEMINISTS BREATHE FIRE 36–37 (Sonia Shah ed., 1997) 
(discussing the 1989 founding of Sakhi, a New York–based advocacy and support group for 
South Asian immigrant domestic violence survivors:  “We have asserted the existence of 
Asian women and refused to be statistically invisible”). 
 12. See generally id.; Crenshaw, supra note 6. 
 13. Chela Sandoval, U.S. Third World Feminism:  The Theory and Method of 
Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World, 10 GENDERS 1, 12 (1991). 
 14. For legal examples of this strategy, see Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple 
Disadvantages:  An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 991, 991–1015 (2011), and Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Critical Race Feminism 
Empirical Research Project:  Sexual Harassment and the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1246–48 (2006).  The approach used in both articles assumes the 
possibility of mutually exclusive categorical memberships, an interpretation of 
intersectionality explicitly rejected by Mitu Gulati and Devon Carbado. See generally MITU 
GULATI & DEVON CARBADO, ACTING WHITE?:  RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 
(2014).  This approach also explains how the use of an interaction term as a way of “setting 
aside” this assumption is insufficient. See Ange-Marie Hancock, Empirical Intersectionality:  
A Tale of Two Approaches, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 259, 277 (2013). 
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intersectionality’s longstanding intellectual project—the visibility aspect, 
the commensurability of attention to multiple categories, and the explicit 
incorporation of the relationships that exist among categories—into a single 
empirical analysis.  Rather than focus on specific types of 
intersectionality,15 the paradigm intersectionality approach requires the 
analysis of five dimensions common to intersectional analyses of complex 
social problems like domestic violence.16 
I.   PARADIGM INTERSECTIONALITY 
A.   Framing the Question 
Paradigm intersectionality features five distinct, intimately connected 
dimensions that seek to comprehensively analyze a complex question like 
the significance of In re A-R-C-G-:  categorical multiplicity, categorical 
intersections, diversity within, time dynamics, and individual-institutional 
relationships.  Successful examination of each of these categories in relation 
to each other, however, requires the creation of an explicitly accurate 
analytical frame.  In other words, we must explicitly and reflectively frame 
the question in a manner that is not simply a derivation of either standard 
empirical social science or standard legal logic.17  In this way, paradigm 
intersectional analysis hews to the definition of what a paradigm shift 
intends to achieve:  developing new ways to ask, as well as answer, 
questions left unanswerable by prior analytical approaches. 
This goal derives directly from the dual intellectual project of 
intersectionality.  In answering questions left unanswerable by prior 
approaches, paradigm intersectionality builds on the arguments of 
Crenshaw and others, who claimed that advocates on both sides of an issue 
debate—for example, both domestic violence advocates and those who 
would leave the matter as an issue of private privilege—render the policy 
needs of women of color invisible.  Remedies for such invisibility have 
 
 15. Crenshaw focuses on three distinct types of intersectionality—political, structural, 
and representational—that have been interpreted to be mutually distinct. See Crenshaw, 
supra note 6.  These types are not replaced by the paradigm intersectionality approach.  
Rather, paradigm intersectionality illuminates the kinds of analytical questions that are 
relevant to the analysis of the problem rather than a categorization strategy.  Thus, one can, 
for example, analyze an issue that is categorized as “political intersectionality” using a 
paradigm intersectionality approach. 
 16. Further explications of paradigm intersectionality’s five dimensions can be found in:  
ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, SOLIDARITY POLITICS FOR MILLENNIALS:  A GUIDE TO ENDING THE 
OPPRESSION OLYMPICS (2011); Hancock, supra note 14; and Ange-Marie Hancock, Trayvon 
Martin, Intersectionality, and the Politics of Disgust, 15 THEORY & EVENT, no. 3, 2012, 
available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v015/15.3.hancock.html.  The 
paradigm intersectionality approach is a theory that undergirds the intersectionality-based 
policy analysis framework recently developed in Canada, which posits several procedural 
steps that require explicit attention. See generally AN INTERSECTIONALITY-BASED POLICY 
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK (Olena Hankivsky ed., 2012); RITA DHAMOON, 
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE POLITICS:  HOW DIFFERENCE IS PRODUCED, AND WHY IT MATTERS 
(2010). 
 17. I have argued elsewhere that the logic of intersectionality diverges from both the 
standard legal and standard positivist story. See supra note 16. 
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been at the heart of most intersectional analyses.  For example, Olena 
Hankivsky and Renée Cormier argue that framing an analytical question 
requires explicit attention to the question—“Is the research framed within 
the current cultural, political, economic, societal, and/or situational context, 
and where possible, does it reflect self-identified needs of affected 
communities?”—as one way of rendering invisible communities visible in 
policy analysis.18 
The BIA’s decision in In re A-R-C-G- is part of a long history of 
inconsistent case law19 that depends in part on the matter of social visibility, 
a requirement imposed in 2006 to further define the relevant requirements 
for a PSG.  The members of a PSG must be visible to society at large, and 
have particularity—that is, they must constitute a group with precise 
boundaries.20  Intersectionality has the potential to intervene in this 
discussion and expand the notion of social visibility and concise boundaries 
by forcing us to think about the relationships among the numerous 
“immutable and fundamental characteristics”21 the immigration court 
system imposes upon seekers of asylum. 
As Hankivsky and many others note elsewhere, the intellectual project of 
rendering previously invisible community needs visible is only one half of 
the intellectual project of intersectionality.22  A paradigm intersectionality 
approach also offers a concrete method of including the second half of 
intersectionality’s intellectual project—reshaping the ontological 
relationships between classifications like race and gender, as well as other 
classifications mentioned by the BIA that in combination create a PSG.  For 
paradigm intersectionality, the empirical operationalization of this second 
intellectual project requires that analytical questions be framed in such a 
way as to recognize that such classifications exist ontologically and that 
relationships among enactments of said classifications in legislation, 
administrative rules, or judicial decisions explicitly address the mutually 
constitutive nature of such classifications.  In other words, paradigm 
intersectionality frames questions in a way that recognizes that 
classifications like race, sex, sexuality, class, and citizenship status are not 
 
 18. Olena Hankivsky, Women’s Health, Men’s Health, and Gender and Health:  
Implications of Intersectionality, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1712, 1716 (2012) (quoting OLENA 
HANKIVSKY & RENÉE CORMIER, INTERSECTIONALITY:  MOVING WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH 
AND POLICY FORWARD (2009), available at http://bccewh.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ 
2009_IntersectionaliyMovingwomenshealthresearchandpolicyforward.pdf). 
 19. See Bookey, supra note 9, at 109.  Bookey draws upon two prior studies that analyze 
198,000 and 400,000 immigration cases, respectively, to conclude that there is wide 
variation among cases taken up and disparate outcomes in asylum cases both by individual 
judges and by particular immigration courts. Id. at 109 n.10. 
 20. Id. at 115 n.35. 
 21. I consider such immigration court–defined characteristics like the gender, national 
status, marital status, and domestic violence survivor classifications below, to be consistent 
with intersectionality’s longstanding history in antidiscrimination doctrine, while 
recognizing that important differences may emerge. 
 22. See generally AN INTERSECTIONALITY-BASED POLICY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 16; DHAMOON, supra note 16. 
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severable; therefore all are equally worthy of consideration in a case like In 
re A-R-C-G-. 
B.   Distinction Between Paradigm Intersectionality 
and Critical Race Feminist Formulations 
While critical race feminism and intersectionality theory have much in 
common normatively, they have varied in their attempts to empirically 
analyze and understand the normative tenets they both embrace.  The 
paradigm intersectionality formulation is distinct from a critical race 
feminist formulation,23 which still might include an additional element 
which is excluded here.  This distinction between critical race feminist 
formulations and paradigm intersectionality formulations of empirical 
questions is often overlooked; the difference primarily concerns at which 
points in the research process the analytical insights of intersectionality are 
applied and to what degree.  Prior critical race feminist formulations have 
focused on empirical operationalizations of intersectionality that apply 
standard positivist methods like multivariate regression while focusing their 
intersectional analyses in two areas:  the identity of the target population 
(such as women of color) and the normative assessment of any empirical 
results.  Thus, one critical race feminist analysis of In re A-R-C-G- might 
inquire:  Did the gender, ethnicity and national status of the respondents 
together affect the outcome of In re A-R-C-G- in support of domestic 
violence survivors? 
This critical race feminism formulation marks a priori an additive (as 
evidenced by the word “together”) and a causal relationship among gender, 
ethnicity and national status variables (as evidenced by the phrase “affect 
the outcome”).  This approach to analyzing the outcome also easily maps 
onto an empirical analysis that collects data disaggregable by ethnicity, 
gender, and national status—data collected in a manner that violates 
intersectionality’s claim that ethnicity, gender, and other categories are 
impossible to disaggregate.24 
Paradigm intersectionality, in contrast, weaves the insights of 
intersectionality throughout the research project.  Indian political theorist 
Rita Dhamoon suggests that we think of a “matrix of meaning-making” to 
capture movement across multiple processes of racialization, gendering, et 
cetera, and the structures of power which discipline them across time and 
space.25  Moreover, sociologists Patricia Hill Collins and Bonnie Thornton 
 
 23. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 14. 
 24. See GULATI & CARBADO, supra note 14, at 130–43; Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1242; 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139. See generally Chela Sandoval, U.S. Third World Feminism:  The 
Theory and Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World, 18 GENDERS 1 
(1991). 
 25. Rita Kaur Dhamoon, Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality, 64 POL. 
RES. Q. 230, 238 (2011).  Dhamoon also contends that starting with such a conceptualization 
of intersectionality in mind, it is also impossible to simply focus on any target population as 
homogenously oppressed. Id. at 233. 
2984 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Dill agree that a different epistemological orientation is required for such 
target populations.  Writing in 1983, Dill explicitly talks about intersections 
and argues for new frameworks: 
I would ask:  How might these frameworks be revised if they took full 
account of black women’s position in the home, family, and marketplace 
at various historical moments?  In other words, the analysis of the 
interaction of race, gender, and class must not be stretched to fit the 
proscrustean [sic] bed of any other burgeoning set of theories.26 
More recently, Israeli-British sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis rejected 
feminist human rights formulations of intersectionality that preserve what 
she terms a “fragmented, additive model of oppression [that] essentialize[s] 
specific social identities.”27  Yuval-Davis and Dhamoon each contend that 
the point of intersectionality is to examine ways in which social visibility 
and invisibility have an impact on PSGs based on how social divisions are 
“concretely enmeshed and constructed by each other.”28 
Thus, a paradigm intersectionality formulation of a research question 
would ask something very different from critical race feminist 
formulation:  How do the enactments of ethnic, gender, and national status-
based classifications in In re A-R-C-G- interact and emerge in our 
understanding of the meaning of In re A-R-C-G- for future undocumented 
women fleeing domestic violence?29 
Both the critical race feminist and paradigm intersectionality 
formulations clearly focus on ethnicity, gender, and national status as 
relevant classifications worthy of attention.  Building on Dhamoon’s 
articulation of “meaning-making,” the paradigm intersectionality 
formulation builds in contingencies through the use of the word 
“enactments” and denaturalizes the privilege of a “causal” relationship 
among the patterns of ethnic, gender, and national status solely as markers 
of disadvantage.  To reiterate my earlier point:  both formulations can be 
normatively focused on socially just outcomes.  The paradigm 
intersectionality approach, however, more critically utilizes positivist social 
science approaches to frame the question, collect and analyze data, and 
arrive at conclusions.  In other words, paradigm intersectionality frames 
questions in a way that recognizes that classifications like race, gender, 
marital status, and citizenship status are not severable and all can be worthy 
of consideration regarding In re A-R-C-G-.  Thus, the following analysis of 
 
 26. Bonnie Thornton Dill, Race, Class and Gender:  Prospects for an All-Inclusive 
Sisterhood, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 131, 137–38 (1983); see also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK 
FEMINIST THOUGHT:  KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 
252 (1990). 
 27. Nira Yuval-Davis, Intersectionality and Feminist Politics, 13 EUR. J. WOMEN’S 
STUD. 193, 205 (2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. For more about how this formulation is uniquely intersectional, see DHAMOON, 
supra note 16, HANKIVSKY & CORMIER, supra note 18, and Lynn Weber & Deborah Parra-
Medina, Intersectionality and Women’s Health:  Charting a Path to Eliminating Health 
Disparities, in GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND MEDICINE (Marcia Texler Segal et al. 
eds., 2003). 
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the decision’s impact proceeds with the paradigm intersectionality 
formulation.  This approach is not only the more accurate operationalization 
of intersectionality’s normative claims, it is also more comprehensive. 
C.   Categorical Multiplicity 
The first dimension of the paradigm intersectionality approach embodies 
the widely accepted intersectional argument that multiple legal 
classifications are relevant to our understanding of a particular case or 
social problem.  Here, paradigm intersectionality corrects for the common 
criticism that a full embrace of multiple classifications has no a priori 
endpoint (thus violating the positivist rule of parsimony)30 by offering three 
criteria to guide categorical selection.  In answering the question, “which 
classifications might we consider relevant to our understanding of In re A-
R-C-G-,” we go beyond the “plain language” of the trial transcripts, the 
briefs, or the decision itself.  Instead, we turn to a broad understanding of 
the signs of injury, social stigma, or lack of access that are present.  Clearly 
the social stigma of being undocumented, the material threat of deportation, 
and survival of severe spousal abuse are the markers of injury literally and 
figuratively.  While the decision and many of the frames of the legal 
arguments that preceded it used gender as the primary lens, it is clear that 
enactments of undocumented citizenship status, transnationality, and 
marital bonds are also relevant to the case.  Moreover, as we shall see in the 
rest of the analysis, instead of thinking of gender as the primary factor with 
citizenship status, transnationality, and marital status as secondary factors 
that “diversify the experiences of women,” the paradigm intersectionality 
analysis gives each of these classifications equal ontological status. 
The second criterion permits us to confirm enactments of gender, 
citizenship status, transnational ethnic identity, and marital status as 
relevant classifications for the target population subject to In re A-R-C-G-.  
The question surrounding this standard is:  What is the substantive issue of 
social justice? 
Many advocates and scholars working in this area acknowledge that 
important human rights are at stake.  Gender-based claims are grounded in a 
long history of international human rights that date explicitly to the United 
Nations Refugee Convention in 1951.31  Although that convention did not 
specifically mention gender as one of the five convention grounds for 
persecution, certainly gendered forms of each ground persist,32 including 
violence against women.  Two additional pronouncements have clarified 
and cemented the connection between the original grounds for persecution 
 
 30. The positivist “rule of parsimony” has a postmodern counterpart in Judith Butler’s 
1990 critique of the “etc.” that feminists use when they list relevant social divisions. See 
Yuval-Davis, supra note 27, at 202–04.  She contends it creates a never-ending process of 
resignification. See id. Yuval-Davis and others have cogently addressed this concern. See id. 
 31. See Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States:  
Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s 
Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46, 49 (2010). 
 32. See id. at 48. 
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and gendered forms of such persecution:  Conclusion No. 39 on Refugee 
Women and International Protection (1985)33 and the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on the 
Protection of Refugee Women (1991).34  The latter set of guidelines 
established legal grounds for the analytical approach discussed in In re A-R-
C-G-:  connecting petitioners’ application for asylum to their membership 
in a PSG.35  Both the United States (in 1995) and Canada (in 1993) 
developed their own national guidelines in accordance with a third 
pronouncement, the United Nations Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme Conclusion No. 73 (1993),36 which 
encouraged state-specific guidelines.  If we think about the arguments 
against inclusion of gendered practices of persecution (like domestic 
violence) as grounds for asylum because they are “family oriented” and 
private matters, rather than politically motivated because of a person’s 
gender status, then the substantive issue of social justice in this context 
centers upon women’s rights to live in a context free of domestic violence. 
The international right of women to live in a violence-free context has 
proceeded in a state-specific fashion, which cuts both ways for immigrant 
women survivors and their advocates.  On the one hand, the PSG approach 
is both more flexible and more nuanced than U.S.-based attempts to 
causally prove intent to discriminate on the basis of a “suspect” category, of 
which there are an extremely limited number (race, sex, color, national 
origin, religion, etc.) with even greater limitations on scope.  On the other 
hand, the liberal framework of the United States curtails the expansive 
potential of the PSG approach by hewing to the “state-specific” mandate 
and translating the PSG standards into standards created by and for the 
United States—focused on civil liberties like free speech and association as 
evidence, which reduces the liberatory potential of the broader standard.  
Second, it also places the United States in routinized judgment of other 
states’ practices.  Seeing this specifically in relationship to In re A-R-C-G-, 
the United States is compelled by its own procedures to sit in judgment of 
those states as it decides whether to accept a claim that a petitioner is a 
member of a PSG. 
This background information regarding the substantive issue of social 
justice provides a window through which to analyze not simply 
immutable/fundamental statuses like those explicitly identified by the 
BIA’s decision in 2014, but also to identify similarly defined statuses left 
out.  For example, by including “married” as a key element of the PSG at 
issue, the BIA creates a window for continued invisibility and/or 
discrimination against LGBT people migrating from states where they are 
 
 33. U.N. Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Refugee Women and 
International Protection Conclusion No. 39 (Oct. 18, 1985), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
3ae68c43a8.html. 
 34. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION 
OF REFUGEE WOMEN (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d4f915e4.pdf. 
 35. See Musalo, supra note 31, at 50. 
 36. U.N. Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Refugee Protection and 
Sexual Violence Conclusion No. 73 (Oct. 8, 1993), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c6810.html. 
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neither granted marriage rights nor even domestic partnership rights.  Thus 
an additional justifiable group membership emerges as legitimately relevant 
to both progress on the issue of social justice and the impact of In re A-R-C-
G-:  sexual orientation.37 
At this point gender, marital status, citizenship status, national origin, and 
sexuality are possible categories for inclusion in the analysis using two 
criteria.  The third criterion allows us to select among them based upon 
what would traditionally be a fairly narrow question of legal analysis—the 
potential impact of In re A-R-C-G-.  However, the third criterion—the 
scope and target of critique—can be applied in both narrow and broad 
terms. 
Although there are scholars who have argued precisely for a narrow 
consideration of landmark cases’ impact,38 both critical race theory and 
intersectionality theory see the scope and target of critique in far broader 
terms.  Bookey’s analysis of asylum denials points us in multiple directions 
for the scope and target of critique.  The wide variation in outcomes prior to 
2014 provides one specific target for policy change—the pursuit of direct 
doctrinal direction from the BIA regarding precedential standards for 
adjudication of asylum petitions of women fleeing domestic violence in 
their countries of origin.  Now that In re A-R-C-G- has been handed down, 
however, what might remain as obstacles requiring our attention and 
possible critique? 
From 1994 to 2012, most denials of asylum did not primarily dispute that 
the domestic abuse suffered by the petitioners constituted persecution.  
Instead, they denied asylum primarily based on evidentiary grounds, 
including:  (1) failure to show that the country of origin’s government was 
unwilling or unable to protect the petitioner from the abuse; (2) overall lack 
of evidence; (3) flight to the United States from the abuse did not constitute 
an expression of a “political opinion” as grounds for asylum; (4) internal 
country of original relocation alternatives existed; (5) no well-founded fear 
of future persecution existed; and (6) failure to establish membership in a 
PSG.39  But we also must consider the qualities of the denials that persisted 
in the 2001–2004 period, when baldly erroneous interpretations of Attorney 
General Reno’s decision to vacate and remand In re R-A-40 (which had 
precedential potential prior to its consolidation) and later Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s stay of the proceedings.  From a policy perspective, two 
alternatives are possible.  First, previous denials—whether clearly 
erroneous or based in evidentiary failures of the petitioner—might be a 
 
 37. While this Article is a priori focused on violence against women, men are also at this 
point excluded from this analysis, although In re A-R-C-G- could be interpreted to include 
men. 
 38. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 39. Bookey, supra note 9, at 121. 
 40. 21 I. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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matter of implicit judicial bias, specifically intersectional biases.41  The 
policy prescription here falls in the area of judicial training and education. 
Second, previous denials—again whether clearly erroneous or based in 
the supposed evidentiary failures of the petitioner—might be a matter of 
specific evidentiary rules with transnational implications that have a 
disparate impact on one region or one country of origin or another.  For 
example, ability to gain reliable and, where necessary, counter-stereotypical 
information about a country’s government resources can be extremely 
difficult to obtain, though clearly relevant to all six of the evidentiary 
reasons for denial found in the Bookey analysis.42  This critique would 
produce policy prescriptions regarding changing the rules of evidence.  Not 
surprisingly, determining a target of critique is a choice of the researcher 
and one that must be made explicit.  For the purposes of this Article, the 
second scope and target of critique, analysis of the evidentiary 
requirements, has been selected because of the recent timing of the 
decision.  It is too soon to rigorously examine at this juncture In re A-R-C-
G-’s impact on subsequent  immigration court decisions. 
D.   Categorical Intersections and Diversity Within 
So far this Article has identified an intersectional frame for the research 
question and a guide to determine which social groups might be relevant for 
further analysis of In re A-R-C-G-.  The second and third dimensions of 
paradigm intersectionality, categorical intersections and diversity within, 
push us to further rethink the standard additive formulas for constituting 
PSGs.  Instead of creating a checklist form of PSG, like “married women 
from Guatemala fleeing severe spousal abuse,”43 which produces a narrow 
benefit to women (or men) who might closely resemble that fixed PSG, 
categorical intersections and diversity within instead work to identify points 
of intersection that include but are not limited to identity-driven (“women”) 
or experiential (“fleeing severe spousal abuse”) characteristics.  Categorical 
intersections function holistically to identify sets of vulnerable populations 
across multiple levels of analysis due to shared vulnerabilities, while 
diversity within seeks markers of difference that render individuals 
susceptible to harassment, discrimination, or deportation.  These 
dimensions work in tandem with the other three dimensions of paradigm 
intersectionality. 
In the current analysis, examining categorical intersections and diversity 
within turns on the social visibility element of the PSG standard.  Analyzing 
the impact of In re A-R-C-G- requires attention to the limits of social 
visibility among intersectionally situated PSG members.  Four procedural 
standards have emerged to further ensure that a particular social group 
located at the intersections of the multiple characteristics is socially visible: 
 
 41. See SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE:  GENDER, RACE, AND 
CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 57, 83–84 (1998). 
 42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 43. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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1.  Procedures must safeguard the voices and interests of the less 
powerful.  To do so they must include representation from all key 
stakeholder groups, including policy makers, grassroots activists, and 
multiple oppressed communities.44 
2.  Human commonalities and differences must be recognized without 
resorting to false essentialism, false universalism, or obliviousness to 
historical and contemporary patterns of inequality.45 
3.  Differential positionings and perspectives in policy dialogues should 
be acknowledged without treating them as fixed representations of a 
PSG.46 
4.  “Tactical and strategic priorities should be led by those whose needs 
are judged by the participants of the dialogue to be the most urgent.”47 
These four standards will comprise the criteria by which we evaluate In 
re A-R-C-G-’s impact.  It is notable that there is no mandated attention to 
one or more specific classifications—there is no mandate of attention to 
gender or race/ethnicity, or citizenship status, for example.  These 
characteristics are relevant to the BIA decision at hand based on the 
previous exploration under categorical multiplicity.  However, the attention 
to commonalities and differences, as noted in standard number two, take 
into account the particular historical moment and those that preceded it, 
which may include moments where enactments of these characteristics have 
changed over time or emerged as salient in different ways. 
E.   Time Dynamics and Individual-Institutional Relationships 
Scholars and advocates focusing on how asylum is granted in the United 
States and elsewhere provide a wealth of historical information at multiple 
levels of analysis.  In each case that falls under the purview of In re A-R-C-
G-, a petitioner’s history of fleeing violence and the country in which the 
violence originated is certainly provided to the immigration court.  A 
paradigm intersectionality analysis, however, expands our attention beyond 
the facts of the case and the role of historical precedent towards a more 
systematic attention to social constructions and visibility of PSGs and the 
ontological relationships between the enactments of enumerated 
characteristics that co-construct them. 
Bookey and Musalo’s separate analyses of U.S. asylum case law since In 
re Kasinga48 provide excellent information regarding the historical 
challenges faced by immigrants and their advocates seeking to use gender-
based justifications to qualify for asylum.  When the BIA granted a teenage 
Fauziya Kasinga asylum to avoid the practice of female genital mutilation 
in her home country of Togo, advocates generated additional claims to 
 
 44. See HANKIVSKY & CORMIER, supra note 18, at 22. 
 45. See generally Elizabeth Cole, Coalitions As a Model for Intersectionality:  From 
Practice to Theory, 59 SEX ROLES 443 (2008). 
 46. Yuval-Davis, supra note 27, at 205. 
 47. Id. at 206. 
 48. In re Fauziy Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
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explore the reach of the decision for claims of other gender-based forms of 
persecution, including domestic violence.49  While relief for child survivors 
of abuse has appeared to be acceptable to immigration courts during the 
nearly twenty years since the Kasinga decision, both reviews of case law 
illustrate several core problems with the final dimension of the paradigm 
intersectionality approach:  individual-institutional relationships. 
The primary problem with using gender-based claims of persecution 
under the PSG doctrine established by In re Acosta50 and later In re 
Kasinga has been the wide variation in asylum case dispositions, a finding 
agreed upon by the U.S. government and independent researchers alike.51  
In the period between Kasinga and In re A-C-R-G- the cause of such wide 
variation stems from three separate problems:  (1) an absence of regulatory 
guidance; (2) explicit misinterpretation of precedent by immigration judges; 
and (3) advocacy for extremely narrow interpretations of gender-based 
persecution by external policy actors.  The role that In re A-R-C-G- can play 
in shifting outcomes for immigrants fleeing gender-based domestic violence 
in particular, and gender persecution more generally, is necessarily tied to 
how it will be interpreted in the future and how individuals and their 
advocates frame their claims for asylum following the BIA’s rather detailed 
decision.  The interaction between judicial interpretations and how 
claimants argue their cases is one example of individual-institutional 
dynamics.  Of course this dynamic alone would not necessarily be unique to 
paradigm intersectionality. 
What paradigm intersectionality contributes to analysis of the individual-
institutional dynamics is attention to the social constructions of the 
claimants themselves and judicial complicity in these social constructions 
that lead to outcomes that perpetuate perceptions of women survivors only 
qualifying as survivors in a very narrow context, like requiring evidence of 
severe physical abuse while minimizing emotional or financial abuse.  Such 
a context fits the mainstream female survivor in the United States but may 
not fit that of a woman arriving as a survivor from another country.52  
Similarly, in cases where the country of origin has a different religious 
background than the United States, pro-asylum decisions rely on religious 
 
 49. Id. at 362. 
 50. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 51. Bookey cites a report from the U.S. Government Accounting Office, which analyzed 
198,000 cases and an academic analysis of 400,000 cases. See Bookey, supra note 9, at 109 
n.10; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:  
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 4 
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf; Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 
Refugee Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) 
(analyzing “databases of decision from all four levels of the asylum adjudication process”). 
 52. Crenshaw’s original analysis in Mapping the Margins follows the argument made 
about black female rape survivors by Jennifer Wriggins to make the point about women of 
color who are either U.S. citizens or immigrants contending with domestic violence. See 
generally Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1983).  
Sherene Razack notes similar outcomes in the Canadian context for Aboriginal women 
survivors of domestic violence, who are members of nations within the Canadian nation. See 
RAZACK, supra note 41, at 69. 
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persecution to grant asylum rather than a gendered definition of that 
persecution.  Prior to In re A-R-C-G-, neither previous approaches to 
understanding the interaction between judicial interpretations and how 
claimants argue their case and gendered analyses of asylum law in the 
United States have been forced to deal with the role of diplomatic relations 
between countries and its varied roles in the social construction of asylum-
seeking immigrants.  This Article specifically explores this aspect of 
individual-institutional relationships in the analysis of In re A-R-C-G- that 
follows. 
II.   A PARADIGM INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS OF IN RE A-R-C-G- 
A.   Relevant Standards for Asylum Seekers 
The BIA decision answered the broader question of whether domestic 
violence can be grounds for gender-based asylum under sections 208(a) and 
241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act by identifying three 
elements that require clarification:  the meaning of “persecution,” what 
constitutes a PSG, and what evidence is required to establish the 
persecution is occurring “on account of” a particular characteristic.53  The 
decision established a three-part test to determine the relevance of a PSG 
and redefined the “social visibility” requirement to mean “social 
distinction.”54  Both elements are discussed in some detail as part of the 
analysis.55 
The BIA made both changes in two earlier 2014 decisions, In re W-G-R56 
and In re M-E-V-G-,57 noting that the test was a clarification and not a 
departure from prior case law.  First, asylum seekers on the basis of 
membership in a PSG must establish that the group is composed of people 
who share an immutable characteristic.58  The BIA defined “immutable” 
more broadly than a plain language interpretation might suggest in In re W-
G-R- and applied it to this case:  “The critical requirement is that the 
defining characteristic of the group must be something that either cannot be 
changed or that the group members should not be required to change in 
order to avoid persecution.”59  It further illustrated that even characteristics 
commonly assumed in the United States to be mutable, like marital status, 
could in effect be immutable elsewhere in the world.60 
The second part of the three-part test requires that the group be defined 
with “particularity.”61  While a group can be identified in the multiple ways 
or “characterized”—in In re A-R-C-G- the multiple characteristics are 
 
 53. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 54. Id. at 392. 
 55. Id. at 392–95. 
 56. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 57. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 58. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392. 
 59. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213. 
 60. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393. 
 61. Id. 
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“married,” “women,” “from Guatemala,” and “unable to leave the 
relationship”—the BIA explicitly locates particularity in the home country 
context according to “commonly accepted definitions.”62  This particularity 
standard also applied in In re W-G-R-, where the BIA decided that it is 
permissible and in fact may be necessary to consider the social and cultural 
context of the petitioner’s home country.63  What might be of particular 
relevance for a paradigm intersectionality analysis is the BIA’s reliance on 
evidence of the survivor’s attempts to gain relief in the home country.  This 
case notes the significance of the respondent’s appeal for help from the 
police as an antecedent to the more compelling piece of evidence:  the 
police’s failure to provide relief. 
Third, and finally, the group must be socially distinct, a standard that 
replaces the prior “social visibility” requirement.64  Instead of requiring the 
perceptions of the individual persecutor—in this case, the abusive 
husband—to recognize the social distinction of the group “married women 
unable to leave the relationship in Guatemala,” the BIA instead shifts to 
relying on the perceptions of the home society regarding the social 
distinction of the group.65  Specifically, the standard turns on whether a 
home society makes meaningful distinctions between the PSG and other 
groups.66 
B.   Analysis 
As noted in the discussion regarding the paradigm intersectionality 
dimension of categorical multiplicity, the PSG approach can be flexible and 
nuanced.  The three cases decided in 2014 clearly attempted to clarify use 
of the PSG standard of documenting persecution, sending what many hoped 
would be a clear message to advocates and immigration judges alike that 
had long been missing.  Considering the multiple categories of gender, 
national origin, citizenship status, and sexuality, what might remain as 
obstacles requiring our attention and possible critique? 
From an intersectional approach, a broader definition of gender as an 
“immutable” characteristic that should not have to be changed to obtain 
relief from persecution allows for enactments of gender that empower 
undocumented women fleeing domestic violence in the future to make 
gender-based claims for asylum in the United States.  Indeed, the BIA 
explicitly set aside the question of whether presenting evidence solely on 
the basis of gender is sufficient, suggesting that PSG claims that involve 
multiple categories of difference might find some level of success.  
However, one particular enactment exists in the decision that can limit its 
reach in ways that have been long criticized by intersectionality research.  It 
is also contained in In re W-G-R- and applied to In re A-R-C-G-, suggesting 
that it will gain wider acceptance due to its repeated articulation by the 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221–22. 
 64. Id. at 212. 
 65. Id. at 217–18. 
 66. Id. at 217. 
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BIA:  a reliance on “the defining characteristic” of the PSG.  What precisely 
constitutes “the defining” characteristic? 
Traditionally a “defining” characteristic in U.S. jurisprudence has been 
sex/gender or another characteristic such as race, ethnicity, national origin, 
or sexuality.  It is possible that women who are unable to obtain relief in 
their home countries due to multiple defining characteristics may again be 
rendered invisible if judges interpret defining characteristic to mean only 
“gender.”  For example, Afro-Peruvian women experience particular forms 
of discrimination that are explicitly due to the social constructions 
associated with their African descent and their gender.67  U.S. immigration 
court judges’ perceptions of racial, ethnic, and gendered descent of women 
fleeing domestic violence from this particular context may have little direct 
social construction to rely on (for example, judges may be fairly ignorant 
about Afro-Peruvian women’s experiences), which often means that 
respondents compete for credibility in court with other longstanding 
narratives about race, gender, and crime.68  Judges may also deem 
themselves knowledgeable by analogy or association about how particular 
women fleeing domestic violence should behave.69  In either context, 
judges have specific ideas about both the “defining characteristic” and how 
particular women fleeing domestic violence should behave, both of which 
are partly now enshrined in the BIA decision, as noted above.  These 
considerations limit the reach of In re A-R-C-G- in important ways and, just 
as importantly, suggest further directions for asylum-based advocates to 
consider as they seek to expand what constitutes persecution as a 
justification for asylum. 
In a similar vein, the BIA’s suggestion that marriage is “immutable”70 
does not change the hegemonic social construction of marriage as a 
relationship between a male and a female.  Thus, thinking through the 
categorical intersections of “married” and “unable to leave the relationship” 
still potentially obscures access to asylum due to gendered persecution in 
the context of domestic violence for those in same-sex partnerships, 
particularly in countries where such relationships lack access to civil or 
legal marriage status.  While the BIA encourages consideration of the 
constraints against dissolution, it does not consider constraints against 
marital formation.71  Considerations of how to litigate for a person in a 
same-sex relationship would require critical decisions about whether a 
 
 67. Sylvia Falcon, Mestiza Double Consciousness:  The Voices of Afro-Peruvian Women 
on Gendered Racism, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 660, 666 (2008). 
 68. RAZACK, supra note 41, at 86–87; see also Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1242. 
 69. Razack notes this phenomenon among white liberal male judges in Canada, who 
fancy themselves “progressives” who understand the criminal justice struggles of Aboriginal 
men, all of which has the impact of rendering the situations of Aboriginal female survivors 
of domestic violence and sexual assault invisible or less legible because they are perceived to 
be less susceptible to victimization (because, for example, they are strong and silent). 
RAZACK, supra note 41, at 74–80.  Judges’ resistance to acknowledging this bias and the 
lack of procedural accommodations such as inclusion of additional evidence or increased 
judicial training regarding such biases remain. Id. 
 70. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 71. See generally id. 
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gendered persecution approach or another form of persecution (like 
religion) would be more effective despite the three-part test established in 
In re A-R-C-G-. 
Public opinion data can provide some limited insight into the changing 
social constructions of undocumented immigrants in a way that also can 
shed light on the kinds of narratives that compete with the individual case 
narratives presented in court.  Numerous studies indicate that despite claims 
to the contrary, the idea of “pure objectivity” about the facts of cases 
remains largely inaccessible to judges and juries alike.72  Thus, 
understanding the competing intersectional narratives at work about 
undocumented immigrants illuminates what judges who aspire to such 
objectivity must contend with. 
The Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey was conducted 
following both the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections in the United 
States.73  Each survey asked eight domestic policy questions, three of which 
concerned immigrants, and requested that respondents indicate on a five-
point scale from whether they strongly agree to whether they disagree with 
the statement.  The survey randomly rotated the order of questions asked, 
including one regarding the respondents’ opinion regarding the proposed 
path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants,74 whether respondents 
agree or disagree that immigration has an overall positive impact on their 
state’s economy,75 and whether DREAM-qualified high school students 
should receive in-state tuition benefits at the college/university level.76  
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of responses from strongly agree 










 72. This is essentially the argument of the attitudinal model of judicial decision making, 
a nearly fifty-year body of work produced by Harold Spaeth, Jeffrey Segal, and a host of 
other scholars. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 73. See Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), RESOURCE CENTER 
FOR MINORITY DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/35163 (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 74. This question was worded “[Illegal/Undocumented—they split the sample with each 
half using one word] immigrants should qualify for citizenship if they meet certain 
requirements, like paying back taxes and fines, learning English and passing a background 
check.” See id. 
 75. This question was worded “Immigration has an overall positive impact on the [state] 
economy.” Id. 
 76. This question was worded “[Illegal/Undocumented—they split the sample with each 
half using one word] immigrants who grew up in the U.S. and who graduated from high 
school here, should qualify for in-state college tuition.” Id. 
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Table 1:  2008 Comparative Multiracial Political Survey (n=4278) 
 
Table 2:  2012 Comparative Multiracial Political Survey (n=2453) 
 
In each of these tables, the samples of U.S. citizens who agree with a 
path to citizenship and that DREAM-qualified students should get in-state 
college tuition benefits are relatively robust.  The only major difference 
between the 2008 and 2012 results appears to be a strong indication that 
respondents in 2012 neither agree nor disagree with the idea that 
immigration itself has a positive impact on their state’s economy.  Although 
this finding is from snapshot data, it is worthy of mention because it could 
be an early indication of shifting public opinion regarding immigration’s 
value more broadly.  This trend could influence elections in a way that 
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With regard to time dynamics and individual-institutional relationships, 
In re A-R-C-G- potentially continues the pattern of wide variation of 
possible outcomes in asylum cases despite the clarity provided regarding 
standards of evidence for understanding the domestic society in which the 
persecution is claimed to occur.  The expanded evidence, which includes 
the respondent’s personal experiences and background country information 
on marriage in addition to other traditional sources of information,77 clearly 
acknowledges that other nations’ responses to domestic violence or other 
forms of gendered persecution are relevant in adjudicating asylum requests.  
In justifying a third form of evidence, background country information on 
marriage regarding the possibility of marital dissolution is formulated in a 
way that potentially holds survivors responsible for seeking help from 
hostile authorities prior to departure, while not accounting explicitly for 
access to legal services due to characteristics shaped by poverty (whether 
personal resources of the respondent, like income, or structural contexts, 
like residential segregation that produce lack of access).  While advocates 
may be able to claim that the possibility of marital dissolution does not exist 
(either de jure or de facto) in certain countries, what are judges to make of 
women fleeing abusive marriages in countries where the possibility of 
marital dissolution does exist? 
The BIA provided a large loophole for judges to reject applications for 
asylum where they conclude a domestic divorce would have sufficed.  
While this might be a parsimonious solution, to use the language of 
positivism, it could hardly be considered a normatively just solution, to use 
the language of intersectionality.  Members of the BIA are appointed by the 
Attorney General, who herself is appointed by the President of the United 
States.  Thus, to the degree that public opinion might shift regarding the 
values of immigration in general, elections and the presidential 
appointments that inevitably follow will continue to shape how the BIA 
upholds or further clarifies the standards for gender-based persecution and 
grants of asylum. 
Finally, in considering the role of time dynamics, the BIA’s dictum to 
consider the entire evidentiary record, and more specifically to ensure 
“updated information,” also potentially limits the number of asylum 
requests that will be granted.  Although the average processing time for 
immigration courts in the United States is 521 days, or over a year and a 
half, courts in jurisdictions with high immigrant populations (both those 
with strict anti-immigrant laws and those without) are closer to an average 
processing time of two years or more (for example, 2.9 years in Phoenix, 
2.5 years in Los Angeles, and 2.3 years in New York).78  Indeed, In re R-A- 
lasted for fourteen years.79 
 
 77. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 78. Immigration Court Processing Time by Charge, TRAC IMMIGR., 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_charge.php (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 79. In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (A.G. 2008). 
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Ensuring updated information over a two- or three-year period introduces 
a host of political concerns into the information gathered about a country as 
well as the facts of a specific case.  First, the reliability of the host 
information upon which many cases rely comes from the U.S. Department 
of State, which has shifting allegiances and of course responds to shifting 
situations of unrest in various parts of the world.  While much of the 
original refugee jurisprudence attended to asylum granted in contexts of 
political unrest or war, in this case, the installment of a new government in 
the country of origin may change the State Department’s assessment of the 
local context, particularly over a two- to three-year period.  Similarly, 
changes in the State Department as presidential administrations change 
hands can also introduce updated information that may expedite 
deportations rather than expand the granting of asylum in ways that 
purportedly serve U.S. geopolitical interests but almost certainly do not 
serve the interests of “married women fleeing domestic abuse.”  To wit:  In 
re R-A- dragged across the presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, 
and Barack Obama due to the actions of Attorneys General Janet Reno, 
John Ashcroft, and Michael Mukasey.80 
Moreover, the personal circumstances of the respondent also can change, 
if evidence is provided of the spouse’s death or other incapacitation, leading 
to the eradication of the persecution itself or threat of persecution.  
Developments such as these may seem far-fetched, but awareness of these 
possible ramifications can encourage tracking of outcomes going forward to 
determine whether additional action (legal or political) is necessary. 
CONCLUSION:  PROVIDING A HAMMER AND A SAW 
This Article has attempted to provide a sort of “rapid response” analysis 
of In re A-R-C-G- using a paradigm intersectionality approach.  Paradigm 
intersectionality allows us to identify future actions regarding tactical and 
strategic priorities, suggesting that determinations of next steps should be 
led by those whose needs are judged by participants in the dialogue to be 
most urgent.  One intersectional activist attorney describes her work 
fighting violence against women in Native American communities: 
I don’t have all the answers, but I have a few tools that I can bring them 
that they can use to build their own community back up.  So it’s like I’m 
bringing them a hammer and a saw but I’m not building it for them, and I 
love that.81 
This is a particular form of solidarity that can be practiced by attorneys 
working with clients with significantly less power than them.  However it is 
a conscious strategy and not identical to standard “public service” or “pro 
 
 80. Reno’s action, Ashcroft’s reaction, and Mukasey’s push for a decision without the 
issuing of final guidelines for said adjudication are chronicled by Bookey. See Bookey, 
supra note 9, at 114–16. 
 81. This quote is attributed to Sarah Reed, a pseudonym, in SHARON DOESTCH-KIDDER, 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND INTERSECTIONAL ACTIVISM:  THE SPIRIT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT 148 
(2012). 
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bono” work, which is clearly tied to intersectional praxis developed by the 
many intersectionality theorists cited in this Article. 
The paradigm intersectionality approach is valuable for three reasons.  
First, it allows for a 360-degree interrogation of the possible ramifications 
following the BIA’s decision, crystallizing decision points for future 
litigation and advocacy.  Second, its operationalization of intersectionality’s 
broader theoretical insights corrects for prior, uncritical embraces of 
positivist social science approaches to critical race theory questions of 
meaningful access to justice.  Third and finally, paradigm intersectionality 
identifies what is still missing in the pursuit of meaningful access to just 
outcomes. 
In re A-R-C-G- greatly clarified PSG standards.  However, the previously 
identified challenge of limited public access to proceedings and decisions 
remains.  In addition to regulatory guidelines from the Department of 
Homeland Security that would incorporate In re A-R-C-G- administratively, 
it may be time for a concerted effort to obtain better access to the data 
surrounding asylum cases.  Because only precedential decisions are 
officially published by the BIA, a wealth of understanding regarding 
indexed and unpublished decisions, in addition to the primarily oral 
decisions made by lower immigration court judges, makes tracking 
differential treatment much more difficult.  For example, the BIA publishes 
asylum statistics for every fiscal year, listing how many applications were 
received per country as well as how many were granted, denied, abandoned, 
or withdrawn.  This publication offers no information about gender or other 
immutable and fundamental characteristics, which would shed light on how 
well the system is functioning under In re A-R-C-G-.  Moreover, we cannot 
decipher why, in 2009, 38 percent of asylum requests from China and 29 
percent of requests from Haiti were granted, as opposed to low approval 
percentages from Mexico (2.2 percent), El Salvador (4.8 percent), and 
Guatemala (7.3 percent).82  Perhaps what is needed is a litigation or 
lobbying strategy using the Freedom of Information Act to expand the 
information made available to researchers regarding these administrative 
decisions.  This strategy would accompany any increased advocacy for 
gendered forms of persecution. 
Tracking the impact of In re A-R-C-G- is vitally important for 
undocumented survivors of domestic violence, advocates, and activists 
alike.  A paradigm intersectionality analysis such as the one conducted here 
encourages all involved to engage in litigation and policy reform that 
simultaneously expands the boundaries of traditional positivist social 
science and conventional legal logic. 
 
 82. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECH. IMMIGRATION COURTS, EXEC. OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 2009–2013, at 2–4 (2014), available at 
http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/FY2009-FY2013AsylumStatisticsbyNationality.pdf. 
